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“All very big business, even though honestly conducted, is fraught with such
potentiality of menace that there should be thoroughgoing governmental control
over it, so that its efficiency in promoting prosperity at home and increasing the
power of the nation in international commerce may be maintained, and at the
same time fair play insured to the wage-workers, the small business competitors,
the investors, and the general public.”
-Theodore Roosevelt, August 6, 1912
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2017–2018 legislative session, the California Legislature approved AB
2573, sending the bill to Governor Jerry Brown for his signature. 1 The bill
proposed an exception to California’s tied-house laws that would allow beer
manufacturers to give retail licensees up to five free cases of glassware per brand
each year.2 On September 6, 2018, Governor Brown vetoed the bill and cited
market fairness as the basis for his rejection. 3 He explained the bill would create
“an economic disadvantage for small beer manufactures [sic] who might not be
able to provide free glassware in the same manner as the larger manufacturers.” 4
Governor Brown’s explanation spoke to the bill’s embattled history and echoed
the legislative intent behind California’s post-Prohibition beer laws.5
AB 2573 was a contentious bill that pitted large brewers, and their traditional
market dominance, against craft brewers who are still carving out a place in the
industry.6 Anheuser-Busch InBev (“ABI”) sponsored the bill, and MillerCoors
Brewing Company (“MillerCoors”) expressed conditional support so long as the
bill only applied to glassware.7 ABI and MillerCoors have ownership interests in
at least sixty of the seventy-one “large breweries” in the United States and

1.
Complete
Bill
History
of
AB
2573,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB2573 (last visited Oct. 24,
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. AB 2573, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as passed on Aug. 21, 2018, but not enacted);
Daniel Croxall, Let’s Make Sure We Are Talking About the Same Things: Tied-House Laws and the Three-Tier
System, CRAFT BEER LAW PROF (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2017/02/lets-make-suretalking-things-tied-house-laws-three-tier-system (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(defining a tied house as “any retail outlet that is beholden to a particular alcohol manufacturer for any reason”).
3. Letter from Jerry Brown, Governor, Cal. State to Cal. State Assembly (Sept. 6, 2018) [hereinafter
Brown Letter] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
4. Id.
5. Compare id. (discussing how the bill would give larger manufacturers a market advantage because it
permitted a cost-prohibitive activity), with MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE LIQUOR LEGISLATION 20 (1941)
(explaining that legislators were concerned with the control that large manufacturers had over the industry
before Prohibition), and CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25500(a)(2) (West 2018) (prohibiting manufacturers from
giving “any money or other thing of value” to a retail licensee).
6. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2573, at
4–5 (Apr. 18, 2018).
7. Id.
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collectively produced almost sixty-six percent of all domestic beer in 2017. 8
Alcohol Justice, an industry watchdog,9 and the California Craft Brewers
Association (“CCBA”), a non-profit trade association, officially opposed the
bill. 10
Governor Brown’s veto message stated three policy objectives with respect
to the brewing industry.11 First, he reaffirmed California’s longstanding
inducement ban by acknowledging the adverse impacts that gifts have on the
market. 12 Second, he highlighted the market tension between large and craft
brewers.13 Finally, Governor Brown spoke to the original purpose and core theme
of California’s beer laws—market fairness.14 Governor Brown’s veto
demonstrated the value that history can contribute to the legislative process.15
Large beer manufacturers’ efforts to create market advantages over craft
brewers are not unique to AB 2573.16 Rather, AB 2573 is the most recent

8.
United
States
Breweries,
BREWERS
ASS’N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/directories/breweries/?type=large&term=United%20States&searchby=cou
ntry (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); National Beer Sales &
Production Data, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/national-beer-salesproduction-data/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Number of
Breweries and Brewpubs in U.S., BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/number-ofbreweries/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Craft
Beer Industry Market Segments, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/national-beersales-production-data/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(defining a large brewery as one that produces over 6 million barrels of beer annually).
9. Who We Are, ALCOHOL JUST., https://alcoholjustice.org/about/who-we-are/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
10. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON G OVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2573, at
5
(Apr.
18,
2018);
About
the
CCBA,
CALIFORNIA
CRAFT
BEER
ASS’ N
https://www.californiacraftbeer.com/about-the-ccba/about-ccba-2/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
11. Brown Letter, supra note 3.
12. See id. (“Allowing beer manufacturers to give items of value to on-sale retail licensees could unduly
influence such retailers to purchase those manufacturers’ products”).
13. See id. (“this law creates an economic disadvantage for small beer manufactures [sic] who might not
be able to provide free glassware in the same manner as the larger manufacturers”).
14. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON G OVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2573, at
4 (Apr. 18, 2018). Compare Brown Letter, supra note 3 (postulating that the law creates a benefit only for large
manufacturers), with 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 54 at 1148 (prohibiting manufacturers from giving “any money
or other thing of value” to retail licensees), and MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20–22 (discussing
how the prohibition of interests in retail outlets was designed to “prevent a recurrence of the evils that were
prevalent . . . when large liquor interests controlled . . . the industry”).
15. Compare Brown Letter, supra note 3 (“I also worry that this law creates an economic disadvantage
for small beer manufactures [sic]”), with California Beer Wholesalers Ass’n. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd., 5 Cal.3d 402, 407 (1971) (“state legislatures aimed to prevent two particular dangers: the ability
and potentiality of large firms to dominate local markets”).
16. See ASSEMBLY GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2772,
at 5 (Mar. 27, 1990) (“Allows Coors Beer to sponsor waterskiing exhibitions at Marine World theme park in
Vallejo while still permitting the sale of Coors beer at Marine World.”). See also Letter from Richard Floyd,
Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly to George Deukmejian, Governor, Cal. State (July 9, 1990) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (naming Anheuser-Busch as the specific manufacturer who
would be performing the actions permitted by the bill).
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example of a systemic problem with California’s beer laws. 17 Legislating the beer
industry in California is akin to David and Goliath, where “Big Beer” spends
millions of dollars lobbying for laws that are favorable to large manufacturers. 18
Given their limited resources,19 craft brewers rely on groups like the CCBA to
show legislators why Big Beer-sponsored legislation is harmful to the brewing
industry.20 The revenue disparity between large and craft brewers is a major
impediment to craft brewers’ ability to keep up with the Big Beer lobby. 21
In 2017, the brewing industry generated $111.4 billion nationally, and 6,266
craft brewers earned less than a quarter of the total retail sales value. 22
Meanwhile, Big Beer earned fifty-eight percent of the total retail sales in 2017. 23
In total, the seven companies that own all seventy-one large breweries in the
United States earned $64.8 billion compared to the $26 billion split amongst
6,266 craft breweries. 24 Craft brewers earned an average of $4.1 million per
brewery in 2017 compared to Big Beer earning an average of $900 million per
company.25 Big Beer’s command over the market enables it to spend more
money on annual lobbying activities than many craft breweries make in retail
sales per year.26
17. See AB 2573, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as passed on Aug. 21, 2018, but not enacted)
(proposing to allow manufacturers to provide retail licensees with free glassware).
18. See Blair Anthony Robertson, As Craft Beer Flourishes, Big Beer Continues to Buy in and Blur the
Lines,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Dec.
12,
2016,
8:00
AM),
https://www.sacbee.com/fooddrink/beer/article118258943.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “Big Beer”
as Anheuser-Busch InBev, MillerCoors, Constellation Brands, and Heineken); MARIN INSTITUTE, BIG BEER
DUOPOLY 6 (2009), available at https://alcoholjustice.org/images/reports/big_beer_duopoly.pdf (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
19. Compare National Beer Sales & Production Data, BREWERS ASS’N, supra note 8 (showing that craft
brewers earned $26 billion in 2017), with E-mail from MacKenzie Staples, Educational Content Manager,
Brewers Ass’n, to Thomas A. Gerhart, Staff Writer, The University of the Pacific Law Review (Nov. 20, 2018,
09:12 PST) [hereinafter Brewers Ass’n E-mail] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining that large breweries earned $64.8 billion in retail sales value in 2017).
20. About the CCBA, CALIFORNIA CRAFT BEER ASS’ N, supra note 10.
21. See supra note 19 (discussing the difference in retail sales value between large and craft brewers).
22. National Beer Sales & Production Data, BREWERS ASS’N, supra note 8; Number of Breweries and
Brewpubs in U.S., BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8.
23. National Beer Sales & Production Data, BREWERS ASS’N, supra note 8; Brewers Ass’n E-mail,
supra note 19.
24. Brewers Ass’n E-mail, supra note 19; United States Breweries, BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8;
National Beer Sales & Production Data, BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8; Number of Breweries and Brewpubs in
U.S., BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8.
25. Brewers Ass’n E-mail, supra note 19; United States Breweries, BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8;
National
Beer
Sales
&
Production
Data,
BREWERS
ASS’N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/national-beer-sales-production-data/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Number of Breweries and Brewpubs in U.S., BREWERS
ASS’ N, supra note 8.
26. Compare MARIN INSTITUTE, BIG BEER DUOPOLY, supra note 18, at 6 (observing that ABI and
MillerCoors collectively spent over $5 million on lobbying in 2009), with National Beer Sales & Production
Data, BREWERS ASS’N, supra note 8 (noting that the entire craft brewing industry earned $26 billion in 2017).
See also Number of Breweries and Brewpubs in U.S., BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8 (observing that there were
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In 1935, the California Legislature enacted its tied-house laws to prevent
market dominance by powerful industry members.27 The Legislature preserved
the spirit of these laws when it codified them in 1953.28 Since 1953, the
Legislature has passed a multitude of exceptions to its tied-house laws targeting
industry growth, but these exceptions are slowly eroding California’s beer laws. 29
Like AB 2573, some of these exceptions are bad policies because they only
benefit particular industry members—a practice the 1935 Legislature originally
banned. 30 Today, California has numerous exceptions to its beer laws that
contravene the spirit of the law and give Big Beer a government-approved
advantage over craft brewers.31 With Governor Brown termed out of office and a
legislature complacent toward Big Beer’s political agenda, California must find a
way to preserve the spirit of its tied-house laws and protect its craft brewing
industry.32
This Comment proposes a framework that the California Legislature should
codify as a constitutional amendment to eliminate inequitable exceptions to its
tied-house laws.33 A constitutional amendment with retroactive applicability will
ensure current and new beer laws in California maintain the spirit of the law
while avoiding legislative entrenchment.34 Part II provides the history of beer

6,266 craft brewers in 2017).
27. See 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 54(a) at 1148 (prohibiting manufacturers from owning “any interest in
any ‘on sale’ license”).
28. Compare id. § 54(a), at 1148 (banning manufacturers from having ownership interests in retail
licensees), with 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 152, § 25500(a) at 1017 (preserving the 1935 prohibition that manufacturers
shall not “hold the ownership . . . in any on-sale license”).
29. ALCOHOL JUST., TEARING DOWN CALIFORNIA’S ALCOHOL REGULATIONS 1 (2013), available at
https://alcoholjustice.org/images/reports/tearing_down_jan_2013.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
30.
See
Curbing
Favoritism
in
Government,
MERCATUS
CTR.
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/curbing-favoritism-government (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that a government that grants privileges to businesses
“misdirects resources, impedes genuine economic progress, breeds corruption, and undermines the legitimacy
of both the government and the private sector”). See also MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 34 (“The
fundamental principles . . . expressed in these statutes are apparently for the purpose of preventing monopolistic
practices and undue stimulation of sales [resulting from inducements]”).
31. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.12 (West 2018) (allowing retail licensees to purchase stock in
manufacturers); CAL. BUS . & PROF . CODE § 25503.23 (West 2018) (permitting manufacturers to sponsor water
ski shows hosted by retail licensees); CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25503.27 (West 2018) (allowing
manufacturers to give sporting event tickets to retail licensees); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 (West 2018)
(approving manufacturers to give draught equipment to retailers after a natural disaster).
32. Melody Gutierrez, Termed-out Gov. Brown Signs his Final California Budget, S.F. CHRONICLE (June
27, 2018, 2:55 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Termed-out-Gov-Jerry-Brown-signs-his-last13030976.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). See Brown Letter, supra note 3
(declining to enact a proposed law that would give a market advantage to large manufacturers).
33. Infra Part V.
34. John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1776 (2003); see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and
Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1106 (1997) (observing that legislation can
be retroactive to achieve regulatory goals that prospective laws cannot accomplish).
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laws in California.35 Part III investigates four existing exceptions that disregard
the original purpose of California’s tied-house laws.36 Part IV discusses how the
Legislature’s current approach to regulating beer is adversely impacting the
industry.37 Part V proposes a legislative framework that will ensure current and
new beer laws maintain the spirit of California’s tied-house laws.38
II. REGULATING BEER IN CALIFORNIA
With the passage of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, the federal government left the task of regulating alcohol
production and sales to the states. 39 In a 1941 study, the Works Progress
Administration (“WPA”) reported that states regulated alcohol either by
monopoly control, licensing, or prohibition. 40 California, along with twenty-six
other states, utilized a tiered licensing system to prevent large alcohol interests
from controlling the market. 41 Tied-house laws protect markets from largebusiness influence by requiring the manufacturing, distribution, and retail tiers to
operate as distinct members of the industry.42
This part of the Comment provides a history of California’s beer laws from
1933 through 1953.43 Section A presents the post-Prohibition beer laws that
California adopted in 1933 and 1935.44 Section B discusses California’s
codification of the California Statutes, a project that finished in 1953.45
A. Post-Prohibition Legislation in California
In anticipation of the federal government repealing Prohibition, California
passed preliminary alcohol legislation titled the State Liquor Control Act. 46
Congress’s ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment would have created a
legislative void because it left the responsibility of regulating alcohol to the
individual states.47 Fortunately, California’s State Liquor Control Act took effect

35. Infra Part II.
36. Infra Part III.
37. Infra Part IV.
38. Infra Part V.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
40. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 21.
41. Id. at 20, 22, 25.
42. Croxall, supra note 2.
43. Infra Sections II.A–B.
44. Infra Section II.A.
45. Infra Section II.B.
46. See 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 658, § 39 at 1707 (becoming effective “If and when it shall become lawful
under the Constitution and the laws of the United States to manufacture, sell, . . . intoxicating liquors”).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
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with Congress’s 1933 ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment.48 After the
repeal of Prohibition became official, the California Legislature began work on a
comprehensive statutory scheme. 49 These laws took effect in 1935 and were
known as the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. 50
By enacting the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, California created
tied-house laws that explicitly barred integration to prevent large manufacturers
from dominating the market.51 These laws forbade manufacturers and distributors
from holding ownership interests in “any premises where alcoholic beverages are
sold for consumption.”52 Further, the laws forbade inducements to prevent
members of the manufacturing and distribution tiers from influencing the retail
tier.53 The Legislature prohibited manufacturers and distributors from giving
“any money or other thing of value” to a person who owns or maintains a retail
location.54
One of the ways California diverged from traditional three-tier systems is
that it permits manufacturers to distribute their own products. 55 California created
a quasi-two-tier system where manufacturers may self-distribute,56 but
California’s goal remained the same: preserve market fairness by separating
manufacturers and distributors from retail licensees. 57 Although this provision
permits manufacturers to self-distribute, it does not eliminate the distribution tier
altogether; rather, it provides manufacturers with the option to distribute their
beer.58 The provision allowing for self-distribution evolved over time, but it still
exemplifies market fairness in an unbiased manner by giving all licensed
manufacturers the ability to self-distribute. 59
In its analysis of how the states responded to the repeal of Prohibition, the

48. Compare generally, U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, (completing ratification on December 5, 1933), with
1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 658, § 39 at 1707 (receiving approval from the governor on June 3, 1933 with the indefinite
effective date tied to the repeal of prohibition).
49. Compare generally, U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, (satisfying ratification requirements in December
1933), with 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 1 at 1123 (enacting the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act within two years
of the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment).
50. See 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 1 at 1123 (enacting the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act upon approval
by the governor on June 13, 1935).
51. Id. § 54(a)–(b), at 1148; MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 25.
52. 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 54(d)–(e) at 1148.
53. Id. § 54(b), at 1148.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 6(a), at 1127.
56. Id. § 6(a), at 1127.
57. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20.
58. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357 (West 2018).
59. Compare 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 6 at 1127 (“Any manufacturer’s license authorizes the . . .
manufacturer of the alcoholic beverage specified in the license, to . . . sell such alcoholic beverage to persons
holding [retail] licenses”), with 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 152, § 23357 at 965 (“Licensed beer manufacturers may also
sell beer to any person holding a license authorizing the sale of beer”), and CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE §
23357(a) (“Licensed beer manufacturers may . . . sell [their] beer to any person holding a license authorizing the
sale of beer”).
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WPA released a survey titled “State Liquor Legislation.” 60 This federallysponsored publication examined the different states’ approaches to regulating
alcohol and discussed the benefits that a three-tier system would have on the
alcohol industry.61 The WPA concluded that state legislatures implemented
tied-house laws “to prevent a recurrence of the evils that were prevalent before
prohibition when the large liquor interests controlled [the industry] through
vertical and horizontal integration.”62 Further, the WPA explained that
legislatures sought to protect their alcohol markets by prohibiting both
integration and “commercial bribery.” 63
B. The Transition to the Business and Professions Code
The California Legislature created the Business and Professions Code two
years after it enacted the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. 64 Between 1930 and
1953, the California Code Commission completed a comprehensive statutory
cleanup that had been in the works since the California Legislature’s first
meeting in 1849.65 The commission identified twenty-five statutory groupings
and separated the California Statutes—an amalgamation containing all of
California’s laws—into these distinct categories.66 As a result, the commission
codified California’s beer laws within the newly created Business and
Professions Code.67 Although the California Code Commission relocated the
state’s beer laws, the laws remained substantively the same. 68 The commission’s
objective was to restate the law, not create new enactments; thus, the spirit of the
law remained unaltered. 69
60. See generally MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5 (analyzing the different types of alcohol
statutes across the nation).
61. See id. at 20–22 (examining how restricting vertical and horizontal integration prevent large interests
from controlling the market).
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. at 20–21.
64. Compare generally, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1 (West 2018). (establishing the Business and
Professions Code in the 1937 statutes), with 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330 at 1123 (enacting the original Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act on June 13, 1935).
65. Ralph N. Kleps, The Revision and Codification of California Statutes 1849-1953, 42 CALIF. L. REV.
766, 766, 792 (1954).
66. Id. at 793.
67. Compare generally U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment on December 5,
1933), with 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 152 (taking effect on September 9, 1953), and Kleps, supra note 65, at 793 (“the
Commission had settled upon twenty-five subjects which were to be incorporated into the new code
system[and] was finally carried out by 1953”).
68. Compare 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 54(a)–(b) at 1148 (“No manufacturer . . . shall (a) Hold the
ownership . . . interest in any ‘on-sale’ license [or] give . . . any . . . thing of value [to a retail licensee]”), with
CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25500(a)(2) (“No manufacturer . . . shall hold the ownership . . . interest in any onsale license [or] give . . . any . . . thing of value [to a retail licensee]”).
69. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2 (West 2018) (“The provisions of this code in so far as they are
substantially the same as existing statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter shall be construed as
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There have not been any major overhauls to California’s beer laws since their
codification in 1953.70 In the years after the transition, California revised and
modernized its beer laws through new additions to the code. 71 One way the
Legislature continues to expand its beer laws is by creating exceptions that allow
brewers to engage in activities that the code previously prohibited. 72 When the
Legislature allows activities that the law previously prohibited, it may be
disregarding the spirit of the law and creating inequitable exceptions. 73
III. EXCEPTIONS TO CALIFORNIA’S TIED-HOUSE LAWS
California’s beer laws are permissive statutes, meaning licensees may not
perform an act unless the statutes explicitly permit it. 74 Manufacturers responded
to this strict statutory system by lobbying the Legislature to permit more
activities. 75 As a result, California’s beer laws evolved a great deal between 1953
and today; however, two core principles remain constant. 76 First, the laws
continue to prohibit manufacturers and distributors from giving inducements to
restatements and continuations thereof, and not as new enactments”).
70. See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE §§ 25500–25512 (West 2018) (noting that California
codified its Tied-House Restrictions in 1953).
71. See generally id. (listing nineteen statutes that were added to California’s Tied-House Restrictions
after 1953).
72. See generally id. (implementing multiple statutes utilize the phrase “notwithstanding any other
provision of this chapter” to permit activities that were formerly prohibited).
73. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25511 (creating an exception that permits manufacturers to
give tap equipment to a retail licensee), with CAL. BUS . & PROF. CODE § 25500(a)(2) (prohibiting
manufacturers from giving any “thing of value [to a retail licensee]”).
74. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23300 (West 2018) (“No person shall . . . perform any act . . .
unless the person is authorized to do so by a license issued pursuant to this division”), with CAL. BUS. & PROF .
CODE § 25503 (West 2018) (“No manufacturer, . . . bottler, importer, or wholesaler, or any officer, director, or
agent of any such person, shall do any of the following”), and CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25503.5 (West 2018)
(“A winegrower, beer manufacturer, or . . . wholesaler may, without charge, . . . conduct courses of instruction
for licensees and their employees, on the subject of wine or beer”); Daniel Croxall, Are “Beers for a Cause” an
Illegal
Inducement?,
CRAFT
BEER
LAW
PROF
(Oct.
10,
2018),
https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2018/10/beers-cause-illegal-inducement (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
75. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 (creating an exception that allows manufacturers to purchase
new tap equipment for retailer after a government-declared state of emergency); SENATE GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3175, at 2 (June 26, 1990) (documenting support
for the bill from MillerCoors and ABI); CAL. BUS. & PROF. C ODE § 25503.23 (allowing licensees to sponsor
annual water ski shows); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 2772, at 1 (Mar. 28, 1990) (“The purpose of this bill is to allow Coors Beer to sponsor waterskiing
exhibitions at the[] Marine World Park”).
76. Compare 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 6(a) at 1127 (“Any manufacturer’s license authorizes the person
. . . sell . . . alcoholic beverages to persons holding licenses issued by the board authorizing the sale of such
alcoholic beverage[s]”), and 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 54 at 1148 (“No manufacturer . . . shall hold the
ownership . . . interest in any ‘on-sale’ license [or] give . . . any . . . thing of value [to a retail licensee]”), with
CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 23357 (“Licensed beer manufacturers may also . . . . Sell [his or her] beer to any
person holding a license authorizing the sale of beer”), and CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500(a)(2) (“No
manufacturer . . . shall hold the ownership . . . interest in any on-sale license [or] give . . . any . . . thing of value
[to a retail licensee]”).
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retail licensees. 77 Second, California’s tied-house laws still prohibit vertical and
horizontal integration with an exception for manufacturers who opt to distribute
their own beer.78
California has remained mostly true to the two principles at the heart of its
beer laws, despite legislators creating exceptions that contradict the spirit of the
law. 79 Some legislative exceptions echo the spirit of the law by impacting all
brewers equally; 80 however, other exceptions only benefit large manufacturers. 81
This Comment presents four exceptions to California’s tied-house laws, enacted
between 1971 and 1990, that illustrate the negative impact of the state’s
digression from the purpose of its beer laws. 82
Section A discusses an exception that circumvents the three-tier system by
allowing retail licensees to hold stock in brewing companies. 83 Section B
explains the Marine World exception, which allows brewers to sponsor events
hosted by retail licensees under very specific circumstances. 84 Section C explores
the earthquake exception, which allows brewers to provide new tap equipment to
retail licensees in the event of a natural disaster. 85 Section D examines an
exception that directly contradicts the inducement ban by allowing manufacturers
to give retail licensees food, beverages, and transportation to business meetings,
as well as tickets to sporting events.86
A. The Stock Market Exception
Since their enactment in 1935, California’s tied-house laws have prohibited
manufacturers and retailers from holding ownership interests in one another. 87
California enacted an exception in 1971, allowing retail licensees to purchase

77. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500(a)(2).
78. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357(a)(1) (West 2018); CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25500(a)(1) (West
2018).
79. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 23357(a)(1) (allowing all brewers to sell their beer directly to
retail licensees), with CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25503.12 (allowing retail licensees to purchase a diminutive
amount of stock in a manufacturer).
80. E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25502.2(a) (West 2018) (permitting licensees to appear at
promotional events to sign autographs). See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.55 (West 2018) (allowing
brewers to conduct courses for consumers about beer manufacturing).
81. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.12 (allowing retail licensees to purchase stock in
manufacturers), with infra text accompanying notes 96–97 (noting that there are only two publicly traded, nonlarge breweries; one is the second largest craft brewery in the United States and the other is a regional Canadian
brewery).
82. Infra Sections III.A–D.
83. Infra Section III.A.
84. Infra Section III.B.
85. Infra Section III.C.
86. Infra Section III.D.
87. 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 54(a) at 1148.; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500(a)(1).
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“diminutive” shares of stock in licensed manufacturers. 88 The only additional
requirement is that the stock is a part of the New York Stock Exchange,
American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ. 89
In a letter to then-Governor Ronald Reagan, Assembly Member Robert
Badham explained that his proposed exception would resolve problems arising
from large manufacturer’s diversified investments. 90 The legislator explained
there were “instances where one level of an industry held limited amounts of
corporate stock in other levels . . . without intention to violate [the] law.” 91
Badham believed that, by creating an exception to resolve large manufacturers’
non-compliance, he was creating “a more realistic ‘tied house’ law under current
conditions.”92
In reality, many breweries are not public companies, and the majority of
breweries on the stock market are large breweries. 93 Of the eight publicly traded
beer companies, five of the stocks belong to large companies such as ABI and
MillerCoors.94 Another stock is the Craft Brew Alliance, a company that ABI
owns and markets as a craft brewery. 95 Only two of the stocks do not belong to
large brewers,96 one of which is a Canadian regional brewery, and the other is the
second-largest craft brewery in the United States. 97
88. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.12.
89. Id.
90. Letter from Robert E. Badham, Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly to Ronald Reagan,
Governor, Cal. State (July 1, 1971) [hereinafter Badham Letter] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93.
Compare
United
States
Breweries,
BREWERS
ASS’N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/directories/breweries/?type=craft&term=United%20States&searchby=coun
try (last visited Oct. 28, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (identifying 6,959 craft
breweries in the United States as of October 28, 2018), and United States Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N, supra
note 8 (listing seven parent companies owning the seventy-nine large breweries in the United States as of
October 21, 2018), with Beer Stocks, MOTLEY FOOL http://caps.fool.com/tag/beer.aspx?source=itxsittst0000001
(last visited Oct. 28, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (identifying eight publicly
traded stocks tied to breweries or beer companies).
94. Compare United States Breweries, BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8 (listing sixty-six large breweries in
the United States that are owned by ABI or MillerCoors), with Beer Stocks, MOTLEY FOOL, supra note 93
(presenting information on eight beer stocks, including large brewers such as the Companhia de Bebidas das
Americas [ABI], Diageo, ABI, MillerCoors, and Foster’s).
95. Jeremy Bowman, How to Invest in Craft Beer, MOTLEY FOOL (June 11, 2018, 9:31 PM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/06/11/how-to-invest-in-craft-beer.aspx (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
96. Compare Beer Stocks, MOTLEY FOOL, supra note 93 (including Boston Beer Company and Big Rock
Brewery on its list of publicly traded beer companies), with United States Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N, supra
note 93 (identifying the Boston Beer Company as the only United States craft brewer from The Motley Fool’s
list
of
publicly
traded
breweries),
and
Breweries,
BREWERS
ASS’ N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/directories/breweries/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2019) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (identifying the Big Rock Brewery, Ltd. as a regional brewery from
Canada). See also Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8 (defining a regional
brewery as one that satisfies the craft brewery production requirements).
97. BREWERS ASSOCIATION RELEASES 2017 TOP 50 BREWING COMPANIES BY SALES
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This statute appears innocuous at first glance, but upon close examination it
creates a benefit that only larger breweries can utilize. 98 Its legislative history
provides evidence that the Legislature created this statute to help large
manufacturers comply with California’s tied-house laws by changing the laws—
effectively endorsing some integration between retail licensees and large
manufacturers.99 In the end, almost all large brewing companies benefit from this
exception, while only two of over six-thousand craft brewers are public
companies.100
B. The Marine World Exception
In its 1941 analysis of inducements, the WPA equated inducements to
commercial bribery and cited the Federal Trade Commission as the source of its
definition. 101 The WPA noted that commercial bribery involved secretly paying
money to a vendor to influence its purchasing habits. 102 California took a more
rigid approach and did not include secrecy as part of its inducement ban.103 Three
provisions within California’s tied-house laws prohibit brewers from giving “any
money or other thing of value” to businesses that sell alcoholic beverages for onsite consumption.104 In 1990, this provision created an issue for Marine World
and MillerCoors regarding the brewer’s sponsorship of an annual water ski
event. 105
VOLUME, BREWERS ASS’ N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/brewers-association-releases2017-top-50-brewing-companies-by-sales-volume/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2018) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review); Big Rock Brewery History, BIG ROCK BREWERY https://bigrockbeer.com/breweryhistory/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
98. See MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 22 (noting an essential aspect of the three-tier
system is to prevent corporate control, or stock ownership, between manufacturers/wholesalers and retail
licensees). Compare Beer Stocks, MOTLEY FOOL, supra note 93 (listing six large breweries and two craft
breweries that are publicly traded), with United States Breweries, BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8 (listing seven
parent companies that own every large brewery in the United States);), and United States Breweries, BREWERS
ASS’ N, supra note 93 (identifying 6,959 craft breweries that sell beer in the United States as of October 21,
2018).
99. Badham Letter, supra note 90.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 94–96 (observing that there are eight breweries on the stock
market and that six of them are owned by Big Beer).
101. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 36.
102. Id.
103. See CAL. BUS . & PROF. CODE § 25500(a)(2) (barring manufacturers from giving “any money or
other thing of value” to a business holding an on-sale liquor license), CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25502(a)(2)
(West 2018) (prohibiting manufacturers from giving “any money or other thing of value” to a business holding
an off-sale liquor license), CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25600 (West 2018) (forbidding licensees from giving
“any premium, gift, or free goods in connection with the sale or distribution of any alcoholic beverage”).
104. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500(a)(2).
105. See Letter from Thomas M. Hannigan, Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly to George
Deukmejian, Governor, Cal. State (May 25, 1990) [hereinafter Hannigan Letter] (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that MillerCoors and Marine World had unknowingly violated the law for
sixteen years and now—urgently—wanted to legalize their actions).
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Marine World—a theme park that opened in Redwood City, California in
1968—aspired to be the equivalent to Disneyland for marine life. 106 The park’s
offerings included various animal exhibitions, water ski shows, boat rides, and
other aquatic events.107 In the mid-1970s, Marine World—aided by a sponsorship
from MillerCoors—began hosting the annual Coors International Water Ski
Jumping Championships.108
In 1990, Marine World and MillerCoors realized they had been violating
California’s tied-house laws for sixteen years. 109 Marine World asked its local
Assembly Member, Thomas Hannigan, to create an exception within California’s
tied-house laws that would allow MillerCoors to legally sponsor the event that
June.110 Hannigan proposed the bill in early 1990 and, as justification, explained
the “current law prevents Coors from sponsoring [the event] since Marine World
sells Coors beer.”111 Ultimately, the Legislature classified the bill as an “urgency
statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or
safety,” approved it, and sent it to the governor.112 The final version of the law is
extremely narrow, permitting brewers to purchase advertising space from retail
licensees who own stadiums with more than 3,000 seats for annual water ski
shows.113
From the beginning, Hannigan marketed this exception as a bill to legalize
the business dealings between Marine World and MillerCoors. 114 To support the
bill, he argued current law prohibited MillerCoors’s sponsorship because Marine
World sells MillerCoors’s beer.115 One committee’s analysis observed the
purpose of the bill was to allow MillerCoors to sponsor the Marine World events
“while still permitting the sales of Coors beer at the park.”116
106. Redwood City History, Marine World: A Splashy Part of Redwood City’s Past, (Mar. 15, 2017),
http://www.redwoodcityhistory.org/blog/2017/3/10/zm6utap2wmxcyjo4b15w4yorx8utsn (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
107. Id.
108. See Hannigan Letter, supra note 105 (admitting that MillerCoors had illegally sponsored Marine
World’s water ski show for sixteen years); Grimditch Moves Up in Water Ski Jump, S.F. EXAMINER, June 10,
1978, at 34 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
109. Hannigan Letter, supra note 105.
110. Id.; Andrew Sheeler, He ‘kept the Democratic cats herded:’ Former California legislator Tom
Hannigan dies, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 11, 2018, 3:16 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article219868020.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
111. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2772, at 2 (May 15, 1990); CAL. LEG.,
ASSEMBLY
FINAL
HISTORY
1824
(1990)
available
at
https://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/FinalHistory/1989/volumes/8990vol1_2a
hr.PDF/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
112. 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 124, § 2 at 1095 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.23 as an urgency
statute).
113. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.23.
114. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2772, at 1 (Mar. 28, 1990) (“The purpose of this bill is to allow [MillerCoors] to sponsor waterskiing
exhibitions at thee [sic] Marine World Park”).
115. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2772, at 2 (May 15, 1990).
116. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2772,
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Considering the statute applies to all brewers, this exception may seem fair,
but even a shallow investigation reveals that it contradicts the purpose of
California’s beer laws. 117 The Marine World exception achieved two things: it
legitimized sixteen years of illegal business practices, and it granted MillerCoors
a monopoly over Marine World’s water ski show. 118 The exception is so narrow
that it only benefits the two businesses that registered support for it: Marine
World and MillerCoors.119 In essence, MillerCoors received government
approval to turn Marine World’s outdoor stadium into a tied house for a few days
each year.120
The argument in support of the exception provides no logical basis to justify
the bill, and it failed to explain how the bill would impact California’s tied-house
laws.121 The law violates a major tenet of the three-tier system by allowing
MillerCoors to sponsor Marine World’s water ski show because Marine World
sells alcoholic beverages.122 Additionally, the law contravenes the spirit of
California’s beer laws because it created a cost-prohibitive exception that is
advantageous for larger brewers. 123 This exception serves no purpose other than
to benefit Marine World and MillerCoors; therefore, the exception digresses from
at 1 (Mar. 28, 1990).
117. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.23 (granting manufacturers the ability to sponsor water
ski shows hosted by retail licensees), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500(a)(2) (prohibiting manufacturers
from giving any “thing of value” to a retail licensee).
118. Compare Hannigan Letter, supra note 105 (“For the past 16 years Marine World held a water ski
show sponsored by [MillerCoors]. It was recently brought to Marine World’s attention that they were not in
compliance with the tied-house law”), and ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2772, at 1 (Mar. 28, 1990) (“The purpose of this bill is to allow [MillerCoors] to
sponsor waterskiing exhibitions at thee [sic] Marine World Park”), with CAL. BUS . & PROF. CODE § 25503.23
(allowing manufacturers to purchase advertising space from a retail licensee that owns a stadium with a
minimum of 3,000 seats during “an annual water ski show”).
119. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2772,
at 1 (Mar. 27, 1990).
120. Compare ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON G OVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 2772, at 1 (Mar. 28, 1990) (“The purpose of this bill is to allow [MillerCoors] to sponsor waterskiing
exhibitions at thee [sic] Marine World Park”), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.23 (creating an exception
that allows manufacturers to sponsor annual water ski shows from a retail licensee that owns a stadium with
more than 3,000 seats).
121. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2772, at 2 (May 15, 1990)
(“According to the author’s office Coors would like to sponsor a water ski show at Marine World, however,
current law prevents Coors from sponsoring since Marine World sells Coors beer.”).
122. Compare ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON G OVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 2772, at 1 (Mar. 28, 1990) (“The purpose of this bill is to allow [MillerCoors] to sponsor waterskiing
exhibitions at thee [sic] Marine World Park”), with MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 36 (defining
commercial bribery as the giving of gifts to vendors intending to induce the vendor to do business with the
manufacturer).
123. See Paul Hartley, Measuring the Value of Sponsorships, MARKET STRATEGIES INT’L (Mar. 24,
2015), https://www.marketstrategies.com/blog/2015/03/measuring-the-value-of-sponsorships/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that ABI had an annual sponsorship budget of $260 million and
MillerCoors’ budget is $120 million in 2013, while more than 100 other companies budgeted over $15 million
for sponsorships).
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the fairness and equitability that California sought to create in its tied-house
laws.124
C. The Earthquake Exception
In 1964, a 9.2 magnitude earthquake struck Anchorage, Alaska, causing a
tsunami that surged down the coast and headed directly toward Crescent City,
California.125 The tsunami killed four people in Oregon and caused catastrophic
damage when its main waves eventually made landfall.126 The waves that struck
Crescent City peaked at nearly twenty-one feet, obliterated twenty-nine city
blocks, damaged or destroyed over 100 businesses, and caused $15 million in
damages. 127 Less than two months later, the Legislature created a narrow
exception to its tied-house laws, allowing manufacturers to replace alcohol
inventories damaged by the March 1964 tsunami.128
In October 1989, disaster struck again when a 6.9 magnitude earthquake
devastated California’s coast from Santa Cruz to the San Francisco Bay. 129 The
earthquake’s epicenter was in the Santa Cruz Mountains, and people felt the
quake as far away as San Diego, California and western Nevada. 130 The
twenty-second quake caused an estimated $6.8 billion in damages to homes,
businesses, and local infrastructure.131 In total, the Loma Prieta Earthquake
devastated thousands of homes, damaged 2,575 businesses, and destroyed
another 147 businesses. 132 Within two weeks, the California Grocers Association
(“CGA”) circulated a letter—which the Legislature eventually received—

124. Compare ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON G OVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 2772, at 1 (Mar. 28, 1990) (“The purpose of this bill is to allow [MillerCoors] to sponsor waterskiing
exhibitions at thee [sic] Marine World Park”), and United States Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N, supra note 8
(classifying MillerCoors as a large brewery), with MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20–22
(implementing tied-house laws to prevent large manufacturers from controlling the brewing industry).
125. Richard Gonzales, California Town Still Scarred By 1964 Tsunami, NPR (Nov. 17, 2005, 12:00
AM), https://www.npr.org/2005/11/17/5007860/california-town-still-scarred-by-1964-tsunami (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); Crescent City Tsunami Tour Home Page, CITY OF CRESCENT CITY
http://crescentcity.org/tsunamitour/index.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2018) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
126. Richard Gonzales, Tsunami Legacy Lives with People of Crescent City, NPR (Nov. 18, 2005, 12:00
AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5007869 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); Crescent City Tsunami Tour Home Page, CITY OF CRESCENT CITY, supra note 125.
127. Gonzales, supra note 126; Crescent City Tsunami Tour Home Page, CITY OF CRESCENT CITY,
supra note 125; Amy Graff, The day in 1964 when a tsunami ravaged Crescent City, S.F. CHRONICLE (last
updated Jan. 23, 2018, 3:19 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Crescent-City-tsunami-1964Alaska-earthquake-12517983.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
128. 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511).
129. Loma Prieta Earthquake - 20th Anniversary (1989-2009), CAL. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION
https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/Pages/Earthquakes/loma_prieta.aspx (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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discussing its desire for legislation that would allow manufacturers to replace
damaged alcohol inventories.133
Two months later, the Legislature set out to repeal the statute specific to the
1964 Crescent City disaster and replace it with something much broader. 134
Assembly Member Dick Floyd introduced AB 3175 on February 26, 1990,
intending to repeal the 1964 tsunami statute, eliminate disaster-specific
legislation, and suspend the inducement ban following a governor-declared
disaster.135 In a committee hearing on March 28, 1990, a legislator explained that
the bill would allow ABI to provide canned water to stricken areas and that
current law forbids retail licensees from “accepting a single can.” 136 The
legislator did not address that the bill reached beyond both canned water and the
1964 statute to include equipment, fixtures, and supplies. 137 The legislator’s
misrepresentation appeared in other legislative sessions and accompanied the bill
through the Assembly.138 The bill left the Assembly in May and eventually
enacted provisions that allow manufacturers to provide retail licensees with tap
equipment, refrigeration units, and other non-alcohol supplies. 139
There are vast differences between the 1964 tsunami statute, the CGA’s
request, and the law that the Legislature enacted. 140 Essentially, the CGA hoped
133. Compare id. (noting that the earthquake occurred on October 17, 1989), with Letter from Don
Beaver, President, Cal. Grocers Assoc. to Members, Cal. Grocers Assoc. (Oct. 27, 1989) [hereinafter CGA
Letter] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (sending a letter to its members on October 27,
1989, which became part the legislature’s files on AB 3175, proposing legislation allowing manufacturers to
replace damaged alcohol).
134. Hearing on AB 3175 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Governmental Org., 1990 Leg., 1989–1990
Sess. (Cal. 1990) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
135. Id.
136. Statement on AB 3175 (Disaster/Tied House) before the Assemb. Comm. on Governmental Org.,
1990 Leg., 1989–1990 1 (Cal. 1990) (statement by an unidentified legislator on March 28, 1990) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
137. Compare 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511, which
allowed manufacturers to replace alcohol inventories damaged by the 1964 tsunami), and Statement on AB 3175
(Disaster/Tied House) before the Assemb. Comm. on Governmental Org., 1990 Leg., 1989–1990 1 (Cal. 1990)
(statement by an unidentified legislator on March 28, 1990) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (insinuating that the bill would allow manufacturers to provide canned water and generators), with
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 (allowing manufacturers to replace tap equipment and supplies but not
alcohol).
138. Statement on AB 3175 (Disaster/Tied House) before the Assemb. Comm. on Governmental Org.,
1990 Leg., 1989–1990 1 (Cal. 1990) (statement by an unidentified legislator on March 28, 1990) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review); Statement on AB 3175 (Disaster/Tied House) before the Assemb.
Comm. on Governmental Org., 1990 Leg., 1989–1990 1 (Cal. 1990) (statement by an unidentified legislator on
April 16, 1990) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Statement on AB 3175 (Disaster/Tied
House) before the Assemb. Comm. on Governmental Org., 1990 Leg., 1989–1990 1 (Cal. 1990) (statement by
an unidentified legislator on April 30, 1990) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
139. CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25511; CAL. LEG., CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS AB 3175
(FLOYD) - AS AMENDED: JULY 7, 1990, 1989–1990 Sess., at 1 (1990).
140. Compare 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25511 in 1964,
allowing manufacturers to replace alcohol damaged by a specific tsunami), and CGA Letter, supra note 133
(indicating that the CGA preferred a law that would allow manufacturers to replace destroyed alcohol

40

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
the Legislature would extend the 1964 statute and make it applicable to the Loma
Prieta Earthquake. 141 Instead, the Legislature started anew and allowed
manufacturers to replace retail licensees’ damaged tap equipment, refrigeration
systems, glycol coolers, etc. if a natural disaster damaged the equipment.142
This exception created an advantage for large manufacturers because of the
costs associated with replacing tap equipment. 143 The CGA wanted to expand the
1964 statute, which would allow craft brewers to replace damaged alcohol at
cost.144 Considering that ingredients, packaging, and labor represent roughly
twenty-four percent of the retail value of beer, brewers would be able to replace
$20,000 of damaged product for less than $5,000.145 Even the legislator’s
statement about manufacturers providing canned water would be fair because it
would cost a craft brewer approximately fourteen percent of beer’s retail price. 146
Today, manufacturers may only replace equipment—not product—but the
purchase and installation of a complete tap system could cost a manufacturer
$20,000 or more. 147 Unless a brewery manufactures equipment, it will be unable
to mitigate the cost of equipment in the same manner that it could by replacing
damaged product.148
inventories), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 (allowing brewers to give “any equipment, fixtures, or
supplies, other than alcoholic beverages, to a retailer” whose equipment was damaged during a governmentdeclared natural disaster).
141. Compare 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511, which
allowed manufacturers to replace damaged alcohol inventories), with CGA Letter, supra note 133 (indicating
that the CGA would prefer the law to allow manufacturers to replace destroyed alcohol inventories).
142. See CAL. BUS . & PROF . CODE § 25511 (allowing beer manufacturers to give “any equipment,
fixtures, or supplies, other than alcoholic beverages, to a retailer” whose equipment was damaged during a
natural disaster).
143. Compare E-mail from Justin Zalusky, Draft Specialist, KegWorks, to Thomas A. Gerhart, Staff
Writer, The University of the Pacific Law Review (Jan. 3, 2019, 13:24 PST) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (quoting over $4,600 for two four-tap beer dispensers, which does not include any
refrigeration equipment or installation costs), with supra text accompanying note 24 (noting that 6,266 craft
brewers earned $26 billion in retail sales value in 2017).
144. CGA Letter, supra note 133; 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
25511).
145. Joe Satran, Here’s How A Six-Pack Of Craft Beer Ends Up Costing $12, HUFFINGTON POST (last
updated Dec. 6, 2017, 11:39 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/craft-beer-expensive-cost_n_5670015 (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
146. See id. (noting that packaging costs thirteen percent and labor amounts to one percent of the retail
price of beer).
147. Compare E-mail from Justin Zalusky, Draft Specialist, KegWorks, to Thomas A. Gerhart, Staff
Writer, The University of the Pacific Law Review, supra note 143 (providing an estimate for two four-tap
dispensers at over $4,600, but noting that price does not include refrigeration equipment or installation costs),
with Tyler Rueth, Beer Taps - How Many Should You Have?, COPPERTIE (Oct. 7, 2016),
http://coppertie.com/beer-tap-quantity/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (estimating the
average number of draught taps is between eight and twelve for a single venue).
148. Compare E-mail from Justin Zalusky, Draft Specialist, KegWorks, to Thomas A. Gerhart, Staff
Writer, The University of the Pacific Law Review, supra note 143 (pricing two four-tap dispensers at
$4,660.57, but excluding refrigeration equipment or installation costs in the quote), with Satran, supra note 145
(noting that the cost to produce beer, without factoring in profit margins, distributor fees, and taxes represents
twenty-four percent of the price of beer).
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This exception created an advantage for Big Beer because large
manufacturers are better suited to purchase replacement equipment for affected
retail licensees.149 However, at face value, the statute does not appear problematic
because it does not require brewers to purchase replacement equipment. 150 The
WPA’s 1941 survey explained that inducements are detrimental to the alcohol
industry because such gifts may influence retail licensees to conduct business
with certain manufacturers.151 In essence, this exception creates the opportunity
for large manufacturers to give retail licensees replacement equipment,
potentially impacting consumer loyalty and disadvantaging brewers who cannot
afford the expensive equipment.152
D. The Entertainment Exception
California’s rigid inducement ban leaves no room for interpretation—three
different provisions unequivocally forbid brewers from giving any “thing of
value” to retail licensees. 153 The WPA observed that many alcohol laws, if
applied to other industries, would be “unconstitutional extension[s] of State
authority.”154 Nevertheless, the WPA explained that the liquor industry is
“differentiated from all other occupations” because “the right to deal in
intoxicating liquors is not an inherent right.”155 Despite the unambiguous
statutory language and the WPA’s research, the California Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC”) planned to change the law via agency
rulemaking.156
In May 1990, the ABC distributed a bulletin communicating its intent to draft
a regulation that would allow manufacturers to gift retail licensees with
“entertainment and hospitality.”157 Three weeks later, the California Senate
championed the cause and amended a similar bill that had just passed the

149. See supra note 19 (discussing the retail sales disparity between large and craft brewers).
150. See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25511 (imposing no requirement on manufacturers to
exercise the provisions of the statute).
151. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 36.
152. Compare supra notes 19–25 (noting that 6,266 craft brewers split $26 billion compared to the seven
companies that own seventy-one large breweries sharing $64.8 billion in 2017), with MARKETING LAWS
SURVEY, supra note 5, at 36 (equating inducements to commercial bribery, and noting that gifts may impact
how retail licensees contract with other manufacturers).
153. CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25500(a)(2); CAL. B US. & PROF. CODE § 25502(a)(2); CAL. BUS. &
PROF . CODE § 25600(d).
154. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 19.
155. Id.
156. DEP’T OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, BULL., (May 30, 1990) [hereinafter ABC Bulletin].
157. See id. (“As part of its proposed rulemaking, the Department is in the process of drafting a
regulation that would authorize suppliers to furnish modest entertainment and hospitality to retailers and/or their
employees.”).
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Assembly. 158 The Senate added a second provision to AB 3175—the bill that
would eventually allow manufacturers to purchase replacement equipment for
retail licensees after a natural disaster. 159 The new addition to AB 3175 would
allow manufacturers to give retail licensees food, beverages, and transportation
for business meetings, as well as tickets to sporting events. 160 A lobbyist for
MillerCoors issued an immediate response to the change, submitting a letter of
support for the modifications on the same day that the Senate modified AB
3175.161
While explaining the entertainment exception, one legislator commented, “it
is unclear what the rules are.”162 This legislator reasoned that the law should
allow manufacturers “to pay for meals and tickets on the same basis as allowable
business expenses under the federal tax laws.”163 A subsequent letter from
MillerCoors to the governor expressed the company’s desire to “participate in
ordinary business practices which are common to all industries.”164 Both ABI and
MillerCoors conveyed support for AB 3175 by the time it reached Governor
Deukmejian.165
Multiple follies contributed to the support and passage of this amendment to
AB 3175.166 First, the ABC’s bulletin planned to adopt the exception as a
158. Compare SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, C OMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
3175, at 1 (June 26, 1990) (noting that AB 3175 was amended on June 21, 1990), with CAL. LEG.,
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS AB 3175 (FLOYD) - AS AMENDED: JULY 7, 1990, 1989–1990 Sess., at
1 (1990) (noting that AB 3175 passed the Assembly on May 10, 1990).
159. Compare Hearing on AB 3175 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Governmental Org., 1990 Leg., 1989–
1990 Sess. (Cal. 1990) (statement by a legislator in favor of the bill on April 30, 1990) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (communicating that the bill would only be addressing tied-house laws
with regard to natural disasters), with SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 3175, at 1 (June 26, 1990) (including a provision that would allow manufacturers to provide
food, beverage, and transportation to retailers who are attending business meetings).
160. SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3175, at 1
(June 26, 1990).
161. Letter from Parke D. Terry, Lobbyist, Livingston & Mattesich Law Corp. to Ralph Dills, Senator,
Cal. State Senate (June 21, 1990) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Parke Terry,
LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/parketerry/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
162. Statement on AB 3175 (Tied House) before the S. Governmental Org. Comm., 1990 Leg., 1989–
1990 1 (Cal. 1990) (statement by an unidentified legislator in favor of the bill) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
163. Id.
164. Letter from Sunny Jones, W. Gov’t Aff. Manager, Miller Brewing Co. to George Deukmejian,
Governor, Cal. State (July 12, 1990) [hereinafter Miller Letter] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
165. SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3175, at 2
(June 26, 1990).
166. Compare ABC Bulletin, supra note 156 (indicating that the agency planned to propose a regulation
that would substantively alter the statute), and supra text accompanying note 153 (identifying three separate
statutes that all unmistakably prohibit manufacturers giving “any money or other thing of value” to a retail
licensee), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500(a)(2) (barring manufacturers from giving of anything of value
to a retail licensee), and CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11342.2 (West 2018) (“a state agency has authority to adopt
regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no
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regulation, yet California law does not allow agencies to adopt regulations
contrary to statute.167 Second, the tied-house laws thrice prohibit manufacturers
from giving anything of value to retail licensees, but a legislator argued for an
exception by saying the laws were unclear.168 Third, arguments favoring the
exception indicated that tied-house laws prohibit business practices common
across all industries and ignored the WPA’s explanation for why alcohol laws are
unique. 169 Finally, legislators enacted this exception to align California’s
tied-house laws with federal law despite the Twenty-First Amendment declaring
that individual states are responsible for enacting alcohol legislation. 170
Nevertheless, California enacted the exception, permitting manufacturers to give
retail licensees free transportation, food, and beverages for business meetings, as
well as tickets to sporting events.171
IV. CALIFORNIA’S APPROACH TO LEGISLATING BEER DISREGARDS
THE PURPOSE OF ITS BEER LAWS
Less than a year after Congress repealed Prohibition, the federal government
explained why new alcohol laws focused on tied houses. 172 The Federal Alcohol
Control Administration reasoned that tied houses receive gifts—such as alcohol
and fixtures—from brewers, and that practice makes competition unfair.173 Then,
the WPA analyzed individual states’ post-Prohibition legislation and concluded
that states designed tied-house laws to prevent large manufacturers from
regulation adopted is valid or effective unless consistent and not in conflict with the statute”). See also
Statement on AB 3175 (Tied House) before the S. Governmental Org. Comm., 1990 Leg., 1989–1990 1 (Cal.
1990) (statement by an unidentified Sen. on June 26, 1990) (“it is unclear what the rules are”).
167. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11342.2 (invalidating agency actions that do not comport with statute). See
also SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, C OMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3175, at 1–2 (June
26, 1990) (citing the May 30, 1990 bulletin as the background for adding the entertainment exception).
168. See ABC Bulletin, supra note 156 (identifying three different statutes that all prohibit inducements);
Statement on AB 3175 (Tied House) before the S. Governmental Org. Comm., 1990 Leg., 1989–1990 1 (Cal.
1990) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Now it is unclear what the rules are.”).
169. Compare Miller Letter, supra note 164 (“Miller would like to participate in ordinary business
practices which are common to all industries. We would like to provide meals, tickets on occasion, and
hospitality on a periodic basis to our retailers. Such forms of entertainment are standard and normal in today’s
business world.”), with MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 19 (“The liquor business does not stand
upon the same plane, in the eyes of the law, with other commercial occupations. It is placed under the ban of the
law, and it is therefore differentiated from all other occupations”).
170. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited.”). See also Statement on AB 3175 (Tied House) before the S. Governmental Org.
Comm., 1990 Leg., 1989–1990 1 (Cal. 1990) (statement by an unidentified Sen. on June 26, 1990) (“This bill
allows manufacturers to pay for meals and tickets on the same basis as allowable business expenses under the
federal tax laws.”).
171. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.27.
172. Brewers Face New F.A.C.A. Ax, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1934, at 3 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
173. Id.
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dominating the market.174 Also, numerous post-Prohibition courts reaffirmed the
explanation that tied-house laws protect the beer industry from unfair trade
practices.175
California’s State Liquor Control Act and Alcoholic Beverage Control Act
took two approaches to prevent tied houses and promote market fairness. 176 First,
the state prohibited manufacturers from giving retail licensees inducements
because, as the federal government noted, gifts promote unfair competition. 177
Second, California implemented a modified three-tier system that allows
manufacturers to self-distribute, but the system keeps the retail tier completely
separate from the other tiers.178 These laws prevent large manufacturers from
purchasing retail locations, controlling the alcohol they serve, and consequently
cutting small breweries out of the market. 179 The self-distribution exception is
available to any brewery that wishes to reduce costs by distributing its own
product and does not disadvantage other brewers. 180
Large manufacturers, facing a united front opposed to tied houses and
integration, turned to the Legislature for statutory exceptions that would give
them a market advantage. 181 The practice of creating legislative exceptions to
California’s tied-house laws is almost as old as the laws themselves and has
increased in frequency over time. 182 If carefully crafted, these exceptions can
174. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20.
175. See Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 5 Cal. 3d 402, 408
(1971) (en banc) (“By enacting prohibitions against ‘tied-house’ arrangements, state legislatures aimed to
prevent . . . the ability and potentiality of large firms to dominate local markets through vertical and horizontal
integration”); Allied Properties v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 141, 148 (1959) (en banc)
(“that the Legislature could reasonably proceed on the theory that the public will be adequately protected
against excessive prices by the ordinary play of competition between manufacturers.”).
176. See CAL. BUS . & PROF . CODE § 25500(a)(2) (prohibiting manufacturers from giving “money or
other thing of value” to a retail licensee); CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25503.16(d) (West 2018) (“it is necessary
and proper to require a separation between manufacturing interests, wholesale interests, and retail interests in
the production and distribution of alcoholic beverages in order to prevent suppliers from dominating local
markets”).
177. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500(a)(2); MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 34.
178. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357; CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25503.16(d).
179. Croxall, supra note 2.
180. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357 (“Licensed beer manufacturers may . . . . Sell beer to any
person holding a license authorizing the sale of beer”); Kary Shumway, Brewbound Voices: Deconstructing
Self-Distribution
(Part
I),
BREWBOUND
(July
3,
2017,
3:14
PM),
https://www.brewbound.com/news/brewbound-voices-deconstructing-self-distribution-part (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (observing brewers can save between twenty-five to thirty percent by
self-distributing their product). But see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.12 (allowing a retail licensee to
purchase stock in a manufacturer, which may influence the retailer’s business decisions and disadvantage
brewers that are not publicly traded).
181. See AB 2573, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as passed on Aug. 21, 2018, but not
enacted) (proposing an exception to California’s tied-house laws in 2018 that would benefit large
manufacturers); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.23 (creating an exception that allowed MillerCoors to
sponsor Marine World’s water ski show, an activity previously prohibited by law).
182. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE §§ 25500–25512 (“Chapter 15 added by Stats. 1953, Ch. 152”),
with 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 in 1964, which created an
exception to California’s tied-house laws to help businesses impacted by a tsunami). See also CAL. BUS. &
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coexist with tied-house laws and preserve market fairness, but ignoring the
purpose of tied-house laws undermines the reason they exist. 183 In fact, the
legislative history of each exception discussed above demonstrates how
considering the spirit of the law alleviates damage caused by legislative
ignorance. 184
The California Legislature is on a trajectory that will eventually create so
many exceptions that the government may not be able to justify the law’s
existence. 185 While some exceptions may promote the spirit of the law, 186 the
concerted effort of creating exceptions to California’s beer laws is bringing about
the slow demise of those laws.187 Creating exceptions for specific businesses,
without consideration of the industry as a whole, is eroding the foundation of
California’s tied-house laws.188 Instead of promoting a healthy industry where all
individuals have the same rights, the Legislature is creating the precise scenario
that the original laws sought to prevent. 189 Rather than maintaining a united front
against tied houses and integration, today’s Legislature is making uninformed
policy decisions based on the desires of large companies. 190 This practice will
eventually permit “a recurrence of the evils that were prevalent before
prohibition when large liquor interests controlled . . . the industry.”191 The WPA
PROF . CODE §§ 25500–25512 (showing that in the current laws—excluding repealed statutes—there were two
exceptions added between 1960–1980, eight between 1980–2000, and nine between 2000–2015).
183. Compare 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511, which
allowed brewers to replace damaged alcohol supplies at cost), with CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25511 (creating
an exception that allows all manufacturers to purchase expensive equipment for retailers that only larger
manufacturers can afford).
184. See supra note 166 (citing instances where the legislature and the regulatory agency issued a
statement for regarding an exception that contradicted California’s tied-house laws).
185. See Daniel Croxall, Ever Played Jenga? Too Many Exceptions to Tied-House Laws Render the
Whole
System
Vulnerable,
CRAFT
BEER
LAW
PROF
(Feb.
9,
2017),
https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2017/02/ever-played-jenga-many-exceptions-tied-house-laws-renderwhole-system-vulnerable/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (observing that California has
dozens of exceptions to its tied-house laws and that more exceptions lessen a government’s ability to uphold the
law).
186. See supra note 80 (identifying two exceptions to California’s beer laws that impact all brewers
equally).
187. Croxall, supra note 185.
188. Compare Hannigan Letter, supra note 105 (creating an exception that allowed brewers to sponsor
water ski shows because Marine World asked the Legislature to legalize a business relationship with
MillerCoors), with MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20–21 (observing that states adopted alcohol
laws to prevent vertical integration, horizontal integration, and commercial bribery).
189. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. C ODE § 25503.12 (permitting retail licensees to purchase stock in
manufacturers), with MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20 (“to promote temperance and prevent
vertical and horizontal integration, the legislatures of the various States have employed controls which fall into
five categories”).
190. Compare ABC Bulletin, supra note 156 (identifying three statutes that prohibit manufacturers
giving things of value to retail licensees), with Statement on AB 3175 (Tied House) before the S. Governmental
Org. Comm., 1990 Leg., 1989–1990 1 (Cal. 1990) (statement by an unidentified Sen. on June 26, 1990) (“it is
unclear what the rules are”).
191. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20.
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explained that governments must differentiate the liquor industry from all other
industries; therefore, legislators must approach new alcohol legislation with an
informed, heightened scrutiny.192
V. THE ALCOHOL LEGISLATION AMENDMENT
The constitutional law principle of legislative entrenchment prohibits a
legislature from enacting a statute that binds subsequent legislatures’ “exercise of
legislative power.”193 Unlike legislation, a constitutional amendment could bind
California’s future lawmakers to preserve the purpose of the 1933 and 1935
tied-house laws.194 Further, to address existing laws that undermine the purpose
of California’s tied-house laws, the Legislature should write the amendment to
apply retroactively.195
This Comment proposes a holistic legislative framework in the form of a
constitutional amendment to guarantee that present and future beer laws comport
with the original purpose of California’s tied-house laws. 196 History has
demonstrated that the current approach to beer legislation yields results that
contravene the reason for the laws’ existence. 197 Without an informed approach
to legislating alcohol, California will continue to enact laws that imprudently blur
the lines between alcohol and other industries. 198
The constitutional amendment should address three major issues that
adversely affect California’s tied-house laws: business-specific legislation,
inducements, and integration.199 Section A explains why the Legislature must

192. Id. at 19.
193. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665,
1665 (2002).
194. See MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20 (declining to discuss temperance or propose
binding legislation as a way to resolve the problems with California’s beer laws); Roberts & Chemerinsky,
supra note 34, at, 1776.
195. See Fisch, supra note 34, at 1106 (“Retroactivity may be appropriate . . . if retroactive application is
specifically necessary to achieve an important component of the regulatory goal that cannot be adequately
achieved through prospective application.”).
196. Compare supra Part II (explaining that legislatures enacted tied-house laws to ensure market
fairness), with Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 34, at 1776 (“If a legislature wishes to bind future
legislatures, it must invoke the constitutional amendment process.”).
197. See supra Part III (identifying four current statutes that benefit large manufacturers, do little for
small manufacturers, and do not synergize with the spirit of the law).
198. Compare Statement on AB 3175 (Tied House) before the S. Governmental Org. Comm., 1990 Leg.,
1989–1990 1 (Cal. 1990) (statement by an unidentified Sen. on June 26, 1990) (communicating that the
legislator did not know what the laws were but that he or she wanted to normalize California’s beer laws with
federal tax law), with CAL. LEG., CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS AB 3175 (FLOYD) - AS AMENDED:
JULY 7, 1990, 1989–1990 Sess., at 1 (1990) (noting that AB 3175 passed the senate unanimously), and
MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 19 (“The liquor business does not stand upon the same plane, in
the eyes of the law, with other commercial occupations. It is placed under the ban of the law, and it is therefore
differentiated from all other occupations”).
199. See infra Sections V.A–V.C (presenting three distinct areas where beer laws diverge from the spirit
of the law).
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avoid business-specific beer laws.200 Section B recommends a framework for
prohibiting inequitable inducement exceptions. 201 Section C discusses why it is
important to preserve California’s quasi-two-tier system by preventing
integration.202
A. Business-Specific Legislation
The first step of the recommended framework is to prohibit beer laws written
for specific manufacturers—or groups of manufacturers—because the spirit of
tied-house laws is market fairness. 203 As the Marine World exception
demonstrates, the Legislature must thoroughly examine the implications of
narrow exceptions written in seemingly broad terms because these exceptions
may only benefit a single manufacturer.204 Additionally, the stock market
exception explicitly benefits large manufacturers as a group, and it created an
advantage that nearly all craft brewers cannot utilize. 205 To ensure market
fairness, legislators should only create beer laws that impact all manufacturers
equally; therefore, the Legislature should determine whether a proposed law
explicitly benefits a specific manufacturer. 206
B. Inducement Exceptions
The second step in the proposed framework is to prohibit inducementpermitting legislation that all manufacturers cannot reasonably utilize. 207 This
task is difficult because it excludes exceptions that create implicit benefits for a

200. See infra Section V.A (eliminating legislation that was enacted to benefit a specific manufacturer or
group of manufacturers).
201. See infra Section V.B (asking whether all brewers can reasonably utilize the inducement).
202. See infra Section V.C (probing proposed legislation to determine if it permits integration between
manufacturers/distributors and retail licensees).
203. Compare MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20 (observing that the purpose of the law
was to prevent large manufacturers from dominating the market), with ASSEMBLY G OVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2772, at 5 (Mar. 27, 1990) (proposing the law to
legitimize MillerCoors’ and Marine World’s tied-house violations).
204. See supra Section III.B (creating an exception for all manufacturers but narrowly crafting it to only
apply to the business dealings of Marine World and MillerCoors).
205. See supra Section III.A (noting that Assembly Member Badham proposed the exception to resolve
problems emanating from large manufacturer’s diversified investments).
206. Compare 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511, which
allowed brewers to replace damaged alcohol inventories at cost after a 1964 tsunami), with CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 25511 (allowing manufacturers to purchase and give replacement fixtures and equipment retailers who
lost the equipment in a natural disaster).
207. Compare MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20 (noting that the states enacted tied-house
laws to prevent large manufacturers from dominating the market), with supra text accompanying note 149
(explaining why the earthquake exception is available to all brewers but that it only benefits large
manufacturers).
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single brewer or group of brewers. 208 Inducement exceptions are a pervasive
problem in the brewing industry—of the four exceptions presented in this
Comment, three circumvent the inducement ban. 209 When amending its
constitution, California should identify two factors to help the Legislature
determine whether all manufacturers can reasonably utilize the proposed
exception. 210
First, cost-prohibitive exceptions benefit larger manufacturers because
smaller brewers cannot afford to perform the newly permitted activity. 211
California’s constitution should prohibit beer laws that disproportionately
inconvenience different groups of manufacturers.212 Large manufacturers
expressed support for, and in some cases requested, the activities permitted by
the Marine World, earthquake, and entertainment exceptions. 213 Because
California enacted its tied-house laws to rein in unfair market conditions,
legislators should discern whether the exception “creates an economic
disadvantage for small beer manufactures [sic].”214 Under the earthquake
exception, a smaller brewery might only be able to afford one piece of equipment
at great expense to its profitability. 215 Similarly, the entertainment exception
permits manufacturers to give retail licensees tickets to sporting events, yet
gifting Super Bowl tickets may be out of the question for many craft brewers. 216
The Marine World, earthquake, and entertainment exceptions all give brewers the

208. See CAL. BUS . & PROF. CODE § 25503.23 (creating an exception for all brewers but narrowly
tailoring the exception so that it only applies to the business relationship between MillerCoors and Marine
World).
209. See id. (allowing manufacturers to give money or goods, in the form of sponsorship, to a retail
licensee hosting a water ski show); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 (permitting manufacturers to purchase all
new fixtures and equipment for retailers impacted by natural disasters); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.27
(granting manufacturers the ability to give retail licensees food, beverage, and transportation to business
meetings, as well as tickets to sporting events).
210. See infra notes 211–22 (identifying activities that are cost-prohibitive or do not permit a
manufacturer to mitigate as evidence of unfair legislation).
211. See supra note 24 (noting that the seven companies that own all seventy-one large breweries made
twice as much as the 6,266 craft brewers in 2017).
212. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25503.27 (allowing manufacturers to gift sporting event
tickets to retail licenses), and Super Bowl 53 Tickets, SEATGEEK https://seatgeek.com/events/super-bowl (last
visited Dec. 29, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (calculating that Super Bowl
tickets cost an average of $2,500 per ticket), with Brewers Ass’n E-mail, supra note 19 (noting that large
breweries made $64.8 billion in retail sales value in 2017), and National Beer Sales & Production Data,
BREWERS ASS’ N, supra note 8 (reporting that craft brewers earned $26 billion in retail sales value in 2017).
213. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2772,
at 1 (Mar. 27, 1990); SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
3175, at 2 (June 26, 1990).
214. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20; Brown Letter, supra note 3.
215. Compare supra note 143 (observing that a single, four-tap beer dispenser without refrigeration and
installation costs over $4,600, and 6,266 craft brewers earned a total of $26 billion in retail sales value in 2017),
with Satran, supra note 145 (calculating that brewers who use distributors earn eight percent of total retail value
as profits).
216. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.27; Super Bowl 53 Tickets, SEATGEEK, supra note 212 (valuing
the average price for Super Bowl tickets as $2,500 per ticket).
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ability to engage in expensive activities. 217 Large brewers have more resources
available to regularly utilize these exceptions, whereas craft brewers would
struggle to do so. 218
Second, a brewer’s ability to mitigate costs is indicative of the
reasonableness of the exception. 219 The 1964 tsunami statute illustrates this
principle because brewers could help retail licensees by replacing lost inventories
at a reduced cost.220 The current version of this law creates an exception where
brewers cannot mitigate costs in the natural course of business. 221 Therefore,
creating exceptions where manufacturers can mitigate the expense may result in
statutes that impact all brewers equally. 222
C. Integration Exceptions
The final component of the framework is to prohibit laws that undermine the
three-tier system by permitting vertical integration between retail licensees and
manufacturers.223 California uses a quasi-two-tier system where manufacturers
may self-distribute, and both two- and three-tier systems preserve the divide
between the retail tier and the other tiers.224 Here, the primary concern is keeping
the retail tier free from influences that arise through vertical integration. 225 The
stock market exception exemplifies this concern because it permits integration
with the retail tier by allowing retail licensees to hold diminutive amounts of
stock in manufacturers.226 This exception undermines two- and three-tier systems
by creating an advantage for publicly traded manufacturers because retail
licensees can have ownership interests in such manufacturers.227 Exceptions that
217. See CAL. BUS . & PROF. CODE § 25503.23 (permitting brewers to sponsor annual water ski shows in
stadiums owned by retail licensees); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 (allowing brewers to give fixtures, tap
equipment, and non-alcohol supplies to retailers after a natural disaster); and CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
25503.27 (granting brewers the ability to give sporting event tickets to retail licensees).
218. See supra note 24 (noting that the seventy-one large breweries, owned by seven companies, made
nearly $40 billion more in retail sales value than the 6,266 craft brewers did in 2017).
219. See 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. C ODE § 25511, which allowed
manufacturers to replace alcohol damaged by a 1964 tsunami); Satran, supra note 145 (calculating the cost of
producing and packaging beer to be less than a quarter of the actual price).
220. Compare 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511, which
permitted manufacturers to give retailers alcohol to replace inventories damaged during a tsunami in 1964), with
Satran, supra note 145 (observing that the cost to manufacture beer is less than a quarter of its retail value).
221. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 (allowing brewers to give equipment, not beer, to retailers
impacted by a natural disaster).
222. Compare 1964 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, § 1 at 275 (enacting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 to help
retailers by allowing manufacturers to replace damaged alcohol inventories), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
25511 (replacing the 1964 exception with an exception that a manufacturer cannot utilize without easing costs).
223. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20.
224. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357; Croxall, supra note 2.
225. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 22.
226. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.12.
227. Compare Croxall, supra note 2 (“the three-tier system is a market regulation concept whereby each
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permit integration with the retail tier consequently sanction a form of tied houses
that California sought to prevent with its post-Prohibition laws. 228
The three components of the amendment—preventing business-specific
legislation, unfair inducements, and integration—target common forms of
inequitable alcohol legislation. 229 By amending this framework to California’s
constitution, the Legislature will protect California’s beer industry from
discriminatory beer laws that stifle competition. 230 If California enacts this
framework as a constitutional amendment, it will ensure that new beer laws
comport with the spirit of California’s tied-house laws by preventing laws that do
not impact all brewers equally.231
VI. CONCLUSION
Two trends are simultaneously threatening California’s tied-house laws. 232
First, the Legislature is proposing and enacting an increasing number of
exceptions to California’s beer laws. 233 Second, manufacturers and their lobbies
are working together to create new exceptions to expand their business
practices.234 The Legislature may not realize it, but California is facing a harsh
reality. 235 It must either reevaluate its approach to alcohol legislation, or
California’s beer industry will become the precise thing it created tied-house
laws to prevent: a monopolized industry. 236 California’s governor cannot be the
lone bulwark of fairness between the Legislature and the beer industry because,
as history demonstrates, that practice produces inconsistent results. 237
‘tier’ of alcohol manufacture, wholesale (distribution), and retail must remain completely separate from the
others”), with CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25503.12 (“a retail licensee may hold a diminutive amount of stock in
a corporate licensed manufacturer”).
228. See MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 22 (“the most widespread provision is the one that
prohibits any interest by the manufacturer or wholesaler in the retail outlet.”).
229. See supra Part III (identifying four statutes that created unfair beer laws).
230. See MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20–22 (noting that inducement and integration
bans prevent traditional problems in the alcohol industry).
231. Compare Croxall, supra note 185 (observing that California has enacted dozens of exceptions to its
tied-house laws), and supra Part III (identifying four exceptions that do not impact all brewers equally), with
supra Part V (proposing a constitutional amendment that will eliminate beer legislation that contravenes the
spirit of the law).
232. See supra Part IV (observing an increasing number of exceptions over time); Croxall, supra note
185 (noting that manufacturers are working together to create new exceptions).
233. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25500–25512 (showing that there were two exceptions added
between 1960–1980, eight between 1980–2000, and nine between 2000–2015).
234. Croxall, supra note 185.
235. See AB 2573, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as passed on Aug. 21, 2018, but not
enacted) (presuming the Legislature would not have sent beer legislation designed for larger manufacturers to
the governor in 2018 if had it been aware of the problem).
236. See MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20, 36 (noting that integration and commercial
bribery resulted in large manufacturers dominating the alcohol industry before Prohibition).
237. Compare Badham Letter, supra note 90 (illustrating the Legislature’s intent that it communicated to
Governor Reagan when it asked him to sign the stock market exception into law), and Hannigan Letter, supra
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Although there is no legal requirement for the Legislature to preserve the
spirit of California’s tied-house laws, the state runs the risk of destabilizing its
beer laws by ignoring history.238 It is unreasonable to expect the Legislature to
research history for every proposed beer law because the legislative process is
cumbersome. 239 This Comment synthesizes the history and purpose of
California’s beer laws into a three-pronged framework.240 Amending this
framework to California’s constitution would benefit the state greatly because the
framework precludes legislation that undermines the purpose of California’s beer
laws.241
Incorporating this framework into California’s constitution will ensure that
future beer legislation adheres to the spirit of the law. 242 If the Legislature utilized
this framework between 1935 and 2018, it is unlikely California would have
enacted any of the exceptions discussed in this Comment.243 The Marine World
exception would not exist because it is so narrow that it only affects a single
manufacturer, and it is cost prohibitive. 244 The earthquake and entertainment
exceptions, as well as the vetoed glassware exception, do not adhere to the
framework because not all manufacturers can reasonably utilize these
exceptions.245 The stock market exception would not exist because it allows
integration with the retail tier.246

note 105 (communicating the purpose of the Marine World exception to Governor Deukmejian before he signed
it into law), with Brown Letter, supra note 3 (declining to sign the glassware exception into law because of
fairness concerns).
238. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 193, at 1665. Compare MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5,
at 20, 36 (pointing to integration and inducements as factors that corrupt the alcohol industry), with CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 25503.27 (legalizing inducements from manufacturers to retail licensees), and CAL. BUS. &
PROF . CODE § 25503.12 (permitting vertical integration with the retail tier).
239. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (“The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures
that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate
settings”).
240. Compare supra Part II (presenting evidence that California created its tied-house laws to ensure
market fairness), and supra Part III (identifying four statutes that create advantages for large manufacturers),
with supra Part V (analyzing characteristics from various, unfair exceptions to create an analytical framework
focused on the purpose of California’s tied-house laws).
241. See supra Part V (utilizing three focused questions to determine whether an exception is businessspecific, unreasonably expensive, or causes integration with the retail tier).
242. See supra note 194 (discussing how a constitutional amendment, not legislation, can bind future
legislators).
243. See supra Part V (identifying aspects within each exception that would fail various aspects of the
framework).
244. See CAL. BUS . & PROF. CODE § 25503.23 (allowing manufacturers to sponsor annual water ski
shows at outdoor stadiums, owned by retail licensees, that have more than 3,000 seats).
245. See CAL. BUS. & PROF . CODE § 25503.27 (allowing manufacturers to give retail licensees food,
beverage, transportation, and tickets to sporting events); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 (permitting
manufacturers to give expensive equipment to retailers after a natural disaster); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2573, at 4 (Apr. 18, 2018) (proposing an
exception that would allow manufacturers to give $5,000 in glassware per year per retail location).
246. See CAL. BUS . & PROF . CODE § 25503.12 (giving a retail licensee the ability to hold an ownership
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At a minimum, California should amend this framework to its constitution to
curb the erosion of its tied-house laws by ensuring that future beer laws are
equitable.247 Additionally, the Legislature should take steps to reverse the damage
done while reinforcing the spirit of California’s beer laws. 248 By broadening the
tsunami statute, the Legislature demonstrated its willingness and ability to
reassess the validity of existing legislation. 249 Therefore, the Legislature should
draft the amendment to be retroactive, which would enable it to eliminate
existing beer laws that disregard the spirit of the law.250 If California does
nothing, the pace of erosion to its beer laws will quicken as large beer interests—
aided by uninformed legislating—will enact inequitable laws that disadvantage
small breweries.251

interest in a publicly traded manufacturer).
247. Compare MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 5, at 20 (expressing the intent to prevent large
interests from dominating the market), with supra Part V (proposing a framework that identifies legislation that
favors specific manufacturers or groups of manufacturers).
248. Compare Hearing on AB 3175 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Governmental Org., 1990 Leg., 1989–
1990 Sess. (Cal. 1990) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (intending to repeal the 1964
version of section 25511 of the California Business and Professions Code), and MARKETING LAWS SURVEY,
supra note 5, at 20 (noting that the purpose of the laws was to prevent large liquor interests from dominating the
industry), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.12 (creating an exception designed specifically for publicly
traded manufacturers).
249. See Hearing on AB 3175 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Governmental Org., 1990 Leg., 1989–1990
Sess. (Cal. 1990) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The bill also repeals an obsolete
statute relating to a 1964 earthquake.”).
250. Myers v. Philip Morris Cos., 28 Cal. 4th 828, 840 (2002) (observing that statutes will be prospective
“unless there is an express retroactivity provision”).
251. Croxall, supra note 185; see also supra Section III.C (enacting legislation under the guise of not
knowing what the laws are).

53

